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Introduction
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA; in French Accord
économique et commercial global) has been advertised as the ‘gold standard’1 of the
EU’s new generation of free trade agreements. CETA is a ‘mixed agreement’, i.e.,
its parties are the EU and its Member States, on the one side, and Canada, on the
other. This combination of ambitious content that goes far beyond classic trade
issues such as tariffs, plus its mixed nature make this a fertile ground for a plethora
of legal and political controversies. CETA, moreover, has been drawn all the more
into the spotlight since the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with
the United States was put on hold for the foreseeable future.
A range of the controversial issues surrounding CETA found their way before
the French Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council),2 the country’s highest
authority on constitutional matters. On 31 July 2017, it handed down its decision,
*Assistant Professor at Leiden University; Senior Researcher at The Hague Institute for Global
Justice; and Associate Fellow at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. This case note
was written while the author was a visiting research fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University in
Washington, D.C., funded by a Fulbright-Schuman Scholar Grant.
1European Commission, Joint statement: Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), STATEMENT/16/446, Brussels, 29 February 2016. For an opposing view
from an environmental non-governmental organisation, see Client Earth and Transport &
Environment, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the environment: A gold
standard for the planet or for big business? (November 2016), available at <www.transport
environment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2016_11_CETA_Gold_Standard_FINAL.pdf> visited
12 October 2017.
2To avoid confusion, throughout this case note, the terms Conseil constitutionnel and Conseil will
be used to refer to the French Constitutional Council, whereas Council will refer to the Council of
the European Union.
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concluding that there was nothing in CETA that was at odds with French
constitutional law.3 It was the first national court to reach a substantive judgment on
whether CETAwas compatible with aMember State’s constitution. On 13October
2016, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) had
already ruled on a request for interim measures (einstweilige Anordnung), which it
rejected.4 Only a few weeks prior to the Conseil constitutionnel’s decision, the
European Court of Justice delivered a seminal opinion on the EU-Singapore Free
Trade Agreement, which clarified the mixed nature of the agreement and the extent
of the EU’s exclusive competences within the areas it covered,5 thus becoming an
important point of reference for the judicial scrutiny of CETA and EU trade
agreements in general. CETA will also be subject to ex ante review at the European
Court of Justice, as Belgium requested an opinion on the compatibility of the
agreement’s investment chapter with the EU Treaties on 6 September 2017.6 Thus,
while the Conseil constitutionnel’s decision is another milestone in the judicial saga
surrounding CETA, it is certainly not the end of the road.
In its reasoning rejecting the complaints against CETA, the Conseil employed
a dynamic and cooperative interpretation of sovereignty and showed a strong
attitude of deference both to France’s political branches and to the EU in terms
of international treaty-making. There are, however, some aspects where the
decision would have benefited from greater clarity. Nonetheless, instead of
undermining France’s constitutional order, the Conseil confirmed the
fundamental commitment of France to European integration and international
cooperation. More particularly, it refrained from unduly interfering with the
ability of the EU and its Member States to continue operating as a collective
international actor. Following a brief exposition of the background of the case and
a summary of the Conseil’s decision, the case note elaborates on why despite some
shortcomings, its CETA decision is to be welcomed.
3Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, Décision n° 2017-749 DC, Accord économique et
commercial global entre le Canada, d’une part, et l’Union européenne et ses États membres, d’autre part,
ECLI:FR:CC:2017:2017.749.DC. Translations of parts of the decision used in this case note were
prepared by the author. An English translation was not provided on the website of the Conseil
constitutionnel at the time of writing.
4Bundesverfassungsgericht 13 October 2016, Urteil des Zweiten Senats, 2 BvR 1368/16, ECLI:
DE:BVerfG:2016:rs20161013.2bvr136816. See, for commentary, R.T. Hoffmann, ‘Das CETA-
Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – Nach der Unterzeichnung ist vor der Ratifikation’, 19
Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS) (2016) p. 459. A decision on the merits is yet to follow
at the time this case note was written.
5ECJ 16 May 2017, Opinion 2/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:376, EU-Singapore FTA.
6The procedure used here is established in Art. 218(11) TFEU. See Kingdom of Belgium,
Minister Reynders submits request for opinion on CETA, 6 September 2017, available at <https://
diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/minister_reynders_submits_request_opinion_ceta>
visited 12 October 2017.
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Background
The request for a ruling on constitutional compatibility by the Conseil
constitutionnel was made on 22 February 2017 by a group of 106 left-wing
members of the French Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).7 The members of
parliament availed themselves of Article 54 of the French Constitution, according
to which France cannot ratify an international agreement which in the eyes of the
Conseil constitutionnel contains provisions incompatible with French constitutional
law, unless the Constitution is amended beforehand. Such a request for an a priori
review can be requested by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the
President of either of the chambers of parliament or, as was the case here, by a group
of 60 or more members of either chamber of the legislature.8
The request and the decision are two more points on an already long and eventful
timeline regarding CETA’s negotiation and ratification process. To briefly
recapitulate, the main negotiations for CETA were launched in May 2009 and
concluded in August 2014. In February 2016, the legal review of the text was
completed, which included important amendments including a revised investment
protection chapter reflecting the EU’s ‘new approach’, to assuage concerns about
traditional ad hoc arbitration, including, among other measures, an appellate
mechanism and ‘more detailed commitments on ethics for all tribunal members’9 as
part of a what is called the ‘Investment Court System’. In July 2016, the European
Commission declared that CETA should, for political reasons, be a mixed
agreement.10 In October 2016, the signing of CETA was put in jeopardy by the
refusal of the regional parliament of the Belgian state of Wallonia to lend its consent,
which was required under Belgian constitutional law.11 In an effort to save the
agreement without reopening the text, on 27 October 2016 a Joint Interpretative
Instrument was adopted which further clarified some of the contentious points.12
7 ‘Ceta: 106 députés saisissent le Conseil constitutionnel’, Le Figaro, 21 February 2017, <www.
lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2017/02/21/97002-20170221FILWWW00324-ceta-106-deputes-saisissent-le-
conseil-constitutionnel.php> visited 12 October 2017.
8The possibility for a group of 60 members of parliament to request an Art. 54 review was only
added by virtue of a constitutional amendment in 1992: J.-P. Jacqué, Droit constitutionnel et
institutions politiques (11th edn, Dalloz 2016) p. 243.
9European Commission, supra n. 1.
10European Commission, European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada
trade deal, Press Release, 5 July 2016, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm> visited
12 October 2017.
11See ‘David vs Goliath? Small Belgium region leaves EU-Canada trade deal in crisis’, France24,
22 October 2016, <www.france24.com/en/20161021-eu-canada-trade-deal-ceta-collapses-belgian-
region-wallonia-refuses-sign> visited 12 October 2017.
12 Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Brussels, 27 October 2016, 13541/16.
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The latest steps were the signing of the agreement on 30October 2016,13 its approval
by the European Parliament on 15 February 2017,14 and the decision to
provisionally apply those parts of CETA which fall under the EU’s exclusive
competence from 21 September 2017.15 The still controversial Investment Court
System is not part of the provisional application.16
The requesting members of the Assemblée Nationalemade a range of complaints
in their request for a compatibility review by the Conseil constitutionnel that can be
summarised as follows: First, that CETA introduces obligations which constrain
domestic rulemaking in such a way that it would affect the essential conditions for
the exercise of France’s national sovereignty (conditions essentielles d’exercice de la
souveraineté nationale). In particular, they took issue with CETA’s chapter on
investment protection as infringing basic principles of the rule of law, noting,
furthermore, that the agreement would violate the precautionary principle, which
has constitutional status in France.17 In addition, they contended that CETA’s
provisions on its provisional application as well as on its termination were
unconstitutional.18
The stakes of this decision were high. One the one hand, once given the
judicial green light and ratified, a ‘treaty enjoys constitutional immunity’ in
France, which means that ‘the Conseil constitutionnel will not review its
constitutionality at a later stage’.19 On the other hand, a negative ruling would
13Council Decision (EU) 2017/37 of 28 October 2016 on the signing on behalf of the European
Union of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one
part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] OJ L 11/1.
14European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 February 2017 on the draft Council decision
on the conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada,
of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (10975/2016 –
C8-0438/2016 – 2016/0205(NLE)).
15Council Decision (EU) 2017/38 of 28 October 2016 on the provisional application of the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] OJ L 11/1080. The exact date was
determined later on and jointly proclaimed by Commission President Juncker and Prime Minister
Trudeau, see European Commission, EU and Canada agree to set a date for the provisional application
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, STATEMENT/17/1959, Brussels,
8 July 2017.
16Council Decision (EU) 2017/38, supra n. 15, Art. 1(a), which lists those parts of the
investment chapter that will be provisionally applied. It does not include Arts. 8.18–8.45 of CETA,
which make up Section F on the “Resolution of investment disputes between investors and states”.
17Charte de l’environnement, Art. 5.
18See for the full request by the members of parliament Conseil constitutionnel, Saisine par
60 députés - 2017-749 DC, Paris 22 February 2017, <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2017/2017-749-dc/
saisine-par-60-deputes.149545.html> visited 12 October 2017.
19M. Claes, The National Courts’Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart 2006) p. 469-470.
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put another spanner in the works for the ratification of CETA, and more
importantly, confirm the scepticism of its detractors that the new generation of
Free Trade Agreements (if not all such Agreements) are vehicles of multinational
corporations to erode the state’s regulatory powers, democratic checks, and
hard-won labour and environmental standards. It is doubtful whether CETA
would have recovered from such a setback, given that the ‘Wallonia crisis’ of late
2016 preceding its signing had already come close to exhausting the political
capital between the two parties. As Canada’s then Trade Minister Chrystia
Freeland put it at the height of the crisis: ‘It seems evident for me and for Canada
that the European Union is not now capable of having an international accord
even with a country that has values as European as Canada’.20 Being branded
unconstitutional by a national court of last instance would all but have cemented
this incapacity.
The decision of the Conseil constitutionnel
The Conseil constitutionnel rejected all complaints brought forward by the group of
parliamentarians, after first summarising the content of CETA and its
complementary materials, and clarifying the two standards of review it would
apply to different areas of the agreement.
Regarding the latter point, the Conseil recalled that French constitutional
law consists of more than just the text of the current constitution (the 1958
Constitution of the Fifth Republic). It encompasses an ensemble of norms
that French scholarship calls the bloc de constitutionnalité.21 These include also
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the preamble
of the 1946 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, the Environmental Charter
of 2004 (Charte de l’environnement), fundamental principles recognised by the
laws of the Republic (les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la
République), constitutional objectives (objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle),
and a number of other general principles.22 The Conseil stressed also France’s
commitment to take part in the European Union, enshrined in Article 88-1
of the constitution, noting that the constitutional legislator (constituant) has
thus explicitly acknowledged ‘the existence of a legal order of the European Union
20As cited in S. Amaro, ‘EU trade policy remains at risk despite Belgium support for EU-Canada
deal’, CNBC, 27 October 2016, <www.cnbc.com/2016/10/27/eu-trade-policy-remains-at-risk-
despite-belgium-support-for-eu-canada-deal.html> visited 12 October 2017.
21See D. Rousseau,Droit du contentieux constitutionnel (8th edn, Montchrestien 2008) p. 101-112;
and Jacqué, supra n. 8, p. 165-167.
22The preamble of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic references the 1789 Declaration, the
preamble of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic and the 2004 Environmental Charter.
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integrated into the domestic legal order and distinct from the international
legal order.’23
Subsequently, the Conseil constitutionnel stressed the importance of
distinguishing between matters of, on the one hand, exclusive EU competence
covered in the agreement, and matters of non-exclusive competence (shared and
those solely within the competence of theMember States), on the other. Depending
on whether a particular provision falls into one or the other category, different
standards of review apply. For matters of shared competence, the Conseil checks for
incompatibilities with all norms of French constitutional law.24 For matters falling
within the EU’s exclusive competence, the Conseil applies a more narrow review of
the envisaged agreement’s provisions, i.e., ‘to ensure that they do not challenge a rule
or a principle inherent to the constitutional identity of France.’25 Apart from that,
the Council noted that it will be for the European Court of Justice alone to check
the compatibility of the agreement with EU law.26
In terms of the distinction between exclusive EU competences and shared
competences, the Conseil drew explicitly on the European Court of Justice’s
Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.27 The Council
explained that the parts of CETA’s Chapter 8 that applied to non-direct
investment and its Section F on investor-state dispute settlement did not fall
within the EU’s exclusive competence. In addition, the same applied to
certain – often cross-cutting or generally applicable – provisions in chapters
1 (General Definition and Initial Provisions), 21 (Regulatory Cooperation),
26 (Administrative and Institutional Provisions), 27 (Transparency),
28 (Exceptions), 29 (Dispute Settlement) and 30 (Final Provisions) to the
extent that they related to matters of shared competence.28 Having set out these
parameters, the Council then spent the main part of the decision assessing the
constitutional complaints – first for the chapter on investment and subsequently
for the other shared provisions – before turning to the other provisions and
delivering its overall conclusion.
Regarding Chapter 8 on investment, the Conseil constitutionnel addressed the
complaints regarding excessive constraints on the exercise of national sovereignty,
the principles of judicial independence and impartiality, equality before the law, as
23Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 9 (in the original: ‘l’existence d’un ordre
juridique de l’Union européenne intégré à l’ordre juridique interne et distinct de l’ordre juridique
international’).
24 Ibid., para. 13.
25 Ibid., para. 14 (in the original: ‘de veiller à ce qu’elles ne mettent pas en cause une règle ou un
principe inhérent à l’identité constitutionnelle de la France’).
26 Ibid., para. 14.
27EU-Singapore FTA, supra n. 5.
28Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 17.
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well as making a brief reference to the precautionary principle, which is discussed
in detail later on in the decision. A complaint about CETA’s compatibility with
other international agreements and EU law was summarily rejected by the Conseil
as falling outside the scope of an Article 54 request, which can only be about
compatibility with French constitutional law.29
TheConseil constitutionnel rejected the contention that the essential conditions for
the exercise of national sovereignty would be hampered by CETA’s investment
chapter. In its reasoning, the Conseil stressed that investment protection must be seen
in the context of removing barriers to free trade between the parties.30 Moreover, it
underlined that according to CETA’s provisions, the tribunal (including its appellate
mechanism) set up for adjudicating disputes in this area only has the power to award
monetary damages, applicable interest, and restitution of property,31 as well as to
issue interim measures.32 By contrast, the Conseil noted that the Investment Court
System would have ‘no power of interpretation or annulment of decisions taken by
the organs of the European Union or of the Member States’.33
The Conseil moreover emphasised the equal input by the EU and Canada
regarding the appointment of members of the tribunal and the appellate
tribunal,34 the professional requirements to serve on these tribunals,35 and the
‘fork in the road’ provision of Article 8.22 CETA, according to which investors are
barred from using parallel procedures before domestic courts in case they avail
themselves of the Investment Court System under CETA.36 Taken together with
the Conseil’s subsequent reasoning on CETA’s recognition of the parties’ ‘right to
regulate’,37 it concluded that CETA does not disregard the essential conditions
for the exercise of France’s national sovereignty.
Furthermore, the Council rejected the complaint that Chapter 8 would violate
the principles of judicial independence and impartiality. In reaching this
conclusion, the Conseil stressed the ethics rules contained in Article 8.30 CETA,
which explicitly address the independence of the members of the tribunal and
appellate tribunal and include procedures to maintain such independence.38
29 Ibid., para. 30.
30 Ibid., para. 22.
31Art. 8.39 CETA.
32Art. 8.34 CETA.
33Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 23 (in the original: ‘aucun pouvoir
d’interprétation ou d’annulation des décisions prises par des organes de l’Union européenne ou de
ses États membres’).
34 Ibid., para. 25.
35 Ibid., para. 26.
36 Ibid., para. 27.
37 Ibid., paras. 44-52.
38 Ibid., para. 32.
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Moreover, the Council noted that the members of the tribunal are nominated
for a term of five years, renewable once.39 For the Conseil, these provisions
were sufficient to avoid any breach of constitutionally-guaranteed principles of
independence and impartiality.
Lastly, the Conseil equally rejected the complaint that ratifying CETA would
lead to infringing the principle of equality before the law.40 In its interpretation,
that principle does not preclude regulating different situations differently or
derogating from equality on grounds of public interest, provided that the
difference in treatment resulting from it is directly related to the object of the
law establishing it.41
In terms of substance, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled that the very aim of the
chapter on investment is to ensure equal treatment of both domestic and foreign
investors. This is also highlighted in the Joint Interpretative Instrument, which
notes that: ‘CETA will not result in foreign investors being treated more
favourably than domestic investors.’42 In terms of procedure, by contrast, the
Conseil acknowledged that Section F of Chapter 8 on investor-state dispute
settlement would create a special remedy only available to Canadian investors in
France.43 However, the Conseil considered this difference in treatment justified as
it would directly serve the main objective of CETA, i.e., creating on a reciprocal
basis a protective framework for French (and other EU) investors in Canada and,
vice versa, for attracting Canadian investments in France.44 In a somewhat oddly
positioned afterthought to this section, the Council also noted that given the
subsequent reasoning in its decision, the provisions of Chapter 8 also did not
violate the precautionary principle.45
In the second main part of the decision, the Conseil constitutionnel turned to the
other provisions pertaining to areas of shared competence contained in CETA.
Starting again with the complaint of constraining the essential conditions of the
exercise of national sovereignty, the Conseil did not find any basis in these parts of
CETA either. In particular, it rejected the arguments premised on France’s
capability to legislate and regulate being constrained by CETA. Under the French
constitution, ratified treaties rank above secondary legislation.46 However, the
39 Ibid., para. 33.
40This principle is enshrined in Art. 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen.
41Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 35.
42 Joint Interpretative Instrument, supra n. 12, para. 6 a); Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017,
supra n. 3, para. 36.
43Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, paras. 37–38.
44 Ibid., 38.
45 Ibid., para. 41, referring to paras. 56-59 of the decision.
46French Constitution, Art. 55.
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Conseil did not see this as problematic in the case of CETA given the assurances it
provides to preserve the parties’ right to legislate and regulate in the pursuit of
legitimate objectives of public policy. It referred here specifically to Article 8.9
CETA and the Joint Interpretative Statement, which reiterates the importance of
this right.47 Moreover, it observed that prohibitions of certain measures regarding
foreign direct investment lie within the exclusive competence of the EU,48
implying that they fall outside of the scope of regular constitutional review by the
Conseil. Nonetheless, it noted that even there, certain measures are explicitly
allowed, such as those aimed at ensuring fair competition and on the conservation
and protection of natural resources.49 In addition, regarding the provisions on
advancing regulatory cooperation contained in CETA, it stressed that these were
to be undertaken on a purely voluntary basis.50
The Conseil constitutionnel emphasised in this context the role of the Joint
Committee established by CETA. It can adopt interpretations of the agreement
that bind the tribunals and decisions that bind the parties. The parties thus retain
ultimate control over CETA and how it should be interpreted. This control is
exercised jointly, i.e. by ‘mutual consent’51 between the parties. Seeing that this is
a mixed agreement, the Conseil also noted that while the EU’s position would be
established by the Council of the EU,52 such a position would require the
‘common accord’ of both the EU and the Member States in case Member State
competences are concerned according to the Declaration of the Council and
Member States of 14 January 2017.53 This means that not only the EU, but also
France would retain control whenever non-exclusive competences are at stake. In
a similar vein, the Conseil observed that the inter-party dispute settlement
mechanism established in Chapter 29 of CETA only serves to ensure compliance
with the agreement and in no way affects the rule-making process at the domestic
level.54
Subsequently, the Conseil constitutionnel rejected the complaint that CETA
would violate the precautionary principle enshrined in Article 5 of the Charte
47 Joint Interpretative Instrument, supra n. 12, para. 2.
48Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 46.
49 Ibid., para. 46, referring to Art. 8.4, para. 2 CETA.
50Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 47, referring to Art. 21.2, para. 6 CETA,
and reiterated in the Joint Interpretative Statement, para. 3.
51Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 50, referring to Art. 26.3, para. 3 CETA.
52Art. 218, para. 9 TFEU.
53Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 50. The Declaration of the Council and
the Member States is included in Council of the European Union, Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its
Member States, of the other part – Statements to the Council minutes, Brussels, 27 October 2016,
13463/1/16 REV 1, No. 19, p. 14.
54Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 52.
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de l’environnement. While the requesting members of parliament criticised the
absence of any direct reference to the principle in the text of CETA, the Conseil
pointed to Chapter 22 on trade and sustainable development and observed that
absence of an explicit reference does not automatically amount to a violation of the
principle.55 Moreover, it stressed that the precautionary principle is specifically
protected within the EU by virtue of Article 191 TFEU.56 In addition, the Conseil
noted that CETA specifically authorises the use of economically efficient measures
to prevent environmental degradation where there is a risk of serious and
irreversible damage.57 The Conseil also referred again to the Joint Interpretative
Statement, which stresses the importance of environmental protection and the
parties’ right to define their own environmental priorities and policies.58
Regarding the provisional application of CETA, the Conseil rejected the
complaint that the agreement would leave the matter unsettled of whether the
Member States could terminate CETA’s provisional application and thus
constrain the exercise of their sovereignty. In its assessment, the Conseil referred
to the decision of the Council of the EU of 28 October 2016, in which it was
established that those parts of CETA which fell outside the exclusive competence
of the EU would not be the subject of its provisional application.59 In addition, it
pointed to the Declaration of 14 January of the Council, in which it was
established that if the ratification process for CETA ultimately failed due to
constitutional obstacles, including due to a ruling by a constitutional court, and
following an official notification of this by the Member State in question, CETA’s
provisional application would be halted.60
Lastly, concerning termination of the agreement, the Conseil constitutionnel
addressed the complaint that CETA would ‘irrevocably bind France’,61 which in
turn would also constrain the essential conditions for the exercise of its national
sovereignty. The Conseil rejected the premise of this complaint, observing that the
provisions on termination contained in CETAmade it clear that parties would not
be bound in perpetuity.62 Moreover, the Council noted that, with a view to its
55 Ibid., para. 56-57.
56 Ibid., para. 57.
57 Ibid., para. 58, referring to Art. 24.8 CETA.
58Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, referring to the Joint Interpretative Statement,
para. 9.
59Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 64; referring to Council Decision (EU)
2017/38, supra n. 15.
60Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 65, referring to Council of the European
Union, supra n. 53, No. 20, p. 14.
61Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 68 (in the original: ‘lierait irrévocablement
la France’).
62 Ibid., para. 70, referring to Art. 30.9 CETA.
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object and purpose, the agreement did not even touch upon any matters inherent
to national sovereignty.63
In the remainder of the decision, the Conseil turned very briefly to the other
provisions of CETA, i.e., those that fall within the EU’s exclusive competence.
The Conseil summarily ruled that since they did not violate any constitutional
provisions, a fortiori no rules or principles inherent to France’s constitutional
identity were violated either.64 The Conseil constitutionnel concluded its decision
by stating that, based on all the foregoing, CETA ‘does not contain any provision
contrary to the constitution’.65
Comments: fine-tuning deference at different levels
The decision of the Conseil constitutionnel essentially amounts to authorising
ratification from a French constitutional point of view. The Conseil’s approach can
be described as going beyond mere rubberstamping, but refraining from deep
scrutiny and leaving fewer strings attached than the Bundesverfassungsgericht did in
its CETA ruling on the requested interim measures.66 Being a truly Kelsenian
constitutional court – with several former leading French politicians on the bench,
including Laurent Fabius, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and Lionel Jospin – supposed
to temper legal rigidity with political acumen,67 the Conseil has by and large lived
up to its mandate in this decision.
For the Conseil constitutionnel, the CETA decision was the 14th time it has
been called upon to provide an a priori review of an international agreement.
Before its decision on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Conseil had not held any
international agreement unconstitutional.68 Subsequently, the Conseil has found
63Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 70.
64 Ibid., para. 73.
65 Ibid., para. 75 (in the original: ‘ne comporte pas de clause contraire à la Constitution’).
66Bundesverfassungsgericht 13 October 2016, supra n. 4, in which, among other things, the German
Federal Constitutional Court did not rule out the possibility that CETA may be at odds with German
constitutional identity (paras. 50 and 59) and demanded that the Federal Government clarify and assert
its interpretation of Germany’s power to halt CETA’s provisional application (para. 72).
67This political sensitivity appears even more pronounced in a priori review of treaties as
compared to the review of legislation. For instance, former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing
refrains from taking part in priority preliminary rulings on the issue of constitutionality (questions
prioritaires de constitutionnalité), but does sit on the bench when it concerns international
agreements, such as CETA. Jacqué, supra n. 8, p. 240. See alsoM. Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to
Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 2014) p. 50; and F. Fabbrini, ‘Kelsen in Paris:
France’s constitutional reform and the introduction of a posteriori constitutional review of
legislation’, 9 German Law Journal (2008) p. 1297.
68Conseil constitutionnel 9 April 1992, Décision n° 92-308 DC, Traité sur l’Union européenne,
ECLI:FR:CC:1992:92.308.DC. See also Claes, supra n. 19, p. 469.
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other international agreements, such as the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court and the Lisbon Treaty,69 incompatible with the
constitution and therefore requiring constitutional amendment.
Its task with regard to CETA was all the more challenging because, in both legal
and political terms, it had to take the European level into account in addition to
the French domestic level and, in turn, how the multilevel European
constitutional order interacts with the outside world. In doing so, the Conseil
constitutionnel drew on the full range of legally relevant documents including, in
addition to the French constitution, other norms of its bloc de constitutionnalité,
EU law, European Court of Justice case law, international law, as well as
non-binding (soft) instruments such as the Joint Interpretative Statement and
declarations issued by the EU Member States upon signing CETA.
The following comments, therefore, focus on the elements of
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit (‘friendliness towards international law’) and
Europarechtsfreundlichkeit (‘friendliness towards European law’) in the decision,
arguing that overall the Conseil scored high on both counts, but that it could have
been more specific and outspoken in the former case, and even more deferential
in the latter.
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit
The Conseil constitutionnel has expressed a great deal of confidence in the French
government, especially as regards the use of its treaty-making powers to conclude
the new generation of trade agreements. This is overall to be welcomed, as too
many hurdles and too intricate constitutional arrangements can easily stymie
international action by the EU and its Member States, which together form a
complex collective international actor. The ‘Wallonia crisis’ of late 2016 has amply
demonstrated that, prompting further academic debate on how to hold
governments accountable while still being able to bring Free Trade Agreement
negotiations to fruition.70
69Conseil constitutionnel 22 January 1999, Décision n° 98-408 DC, Traité portant statut de la
Cour pénale internationale, ECLI:FR:CC:1999:98.408.DC, and Conseil constitutionnel 20
December 2007, Décision n° 2007-560 DC, Traité de Lisbonne modifiant le traité sur l’Union
européenne et le traité instituant la Communauté européenne, ECLI:FR:CC:2007:2007.560.DC.
70See, on the one hand, the Namur Declaration, 5 December 2016, <declarationdenamur.eu/en/
index.php/namur-declaration/> visited 12 October 2017, which calls for more (but also more
efficient) involvement of national and regional parliaments in the process, and on the other hand,
the Trading Together Declaration, 25 January 2017, <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/
035467_d81f8a7835434c438cff38b5f20dd036.pdf> visited 12 October 2017, which highlights
the existing democratic checks at the European level and calls for streamlining the process (e.g. by
avoiding ‘mixity’ when possible).
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In its analysis, the Conseil constitutionnel manages to dispel some of the
misconceptions pertaining to CETA and similar trade agreements still in the
making. For instance, it emphasises in no uncertain terms that ultimate authority
over the agreement lies with the parties in the Joint Committee, and that France in
any event retains influence and control through the Council of the EU. It stresses
that CETA’s dispute settlement arrangements, including the Investment Court
System, are governed by internationally approved judicial ethics standards and
contain mechanisms to ensure impartiality and independence.
While the Investment Court System does provide an additional choice of legal
remedy to Canadian investors in France (and the rest of the EU), the Conseil
convincingly explains how this only amounts to a rather limited difference in
treatment, which can be justified both at home (attracting investment) and abroad
(opening up markets for French and other EU investors). It confirmed that CETA
takes environmental and labour standards seriously, in particular through its
chapter on sustainable development and the Joint Interpretative Statement with
their explicit references to the right to regulate, which lend ample protection to
constitutionally-enshrined principles such as the precautionary principle.
A point where the Conseil constitutionnel might have taken its cue from the
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach concerns the termination of provisional application
and termination of the agreement, with which it could have engaged more fully. The
Conseil rightly underlines that CETA explicitly provides for termination of the
provisional application of the agreement as well as for termination of the agreement
after its entry into force. In a bilateral (France and Canada) or non-mixed agreement
with a third country (EU and Canada) such provisions on termination would have
been clear from the point of view of international treaty law. However, given that
CETA is a mixed agreement, the Conseil could have given more consideration to the
position of Member States here, as highlighted by the complainants in their request.
The Conseil is right to point out that only the parts of CETA that fall within the
EU’s exclusive competence will be provisionally applied and to highlight the
declaration made by the Council of the EU in this regard – a source that
was not available at the time of the interim measures decision of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht. However, the declaration only provides limited
guidance here, specifying that when the EU-wide ratification process definitively
fails, the ‘necessary steps will be taken in accordance with EU procedures’.71 This
would not seem to unequivocally support the right of a Member State to terminate
provisional application unilaterally, as was asserted, for instance, by the German
government before its own constitutional court.72 The Conseil constitutionnel
71Council of the European Union, supra n. 53, No. 20, p. 14.
72Bundesverfassungsgericht 13 October 2016, supra n. 4, para. 72. However, the German
government seems to equivocate as regards such a right for unilateral termination of provisional
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could have admitted as much, and in the same breath recall that since only areas of
EU-exclusive competence were concerned, the matter fell outside the scope of the
ordinary compatibility review. As long as provisional application does not
encroach upon France’s constitutional identity, there is no need for a unilateral
emergency break that could be triggered by the French government.
A need for greater clarity also applies to the constraints that the French
government may face regarding the termination of the CETA after its entry into
force. On this aspect, the Conseil should have been even less succinct and more
detailed in its reasoning compared to its treatment of provisional application. As it
rightly pointed out, CETA explicitly provides for termination. However, here the
situation is distinctly more complicated than in the preceding area of provisional
application. Being a mixed agreement covering areas of both exclusive and non-
exclusive competences, it is not at all clear whether Member States would have a
unilateral, absolute right of termination. On one hand, they are parties to the
agreement. On the other, they are not empowered to denounce parts of an
agreement for which they have transferred competences to the Union. Instead, the
Conseil waves this complaint off by stating that, in light of its purpose, the
agreement does not touch upon ‘a domain inherent to national sovereignty’.73
This is contrary to the assessment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which was
explicit about the possibility that CETA as a whole – once it enters into force in its
entirety, including the chapter on investment – may be at odds with Germany’s
constitutional identity. With regard to both termination of provisional application
and termination of the agreement, at the very least consultation with the EU
institutions would be required as part of the duty of sincere cooperation discussed
below – rather than giving the French government a completely free hand, as the
Conseil seems to suggest.
Moreover, the decision might have benefited from an acknowledgement of the
evolution – propelled also by the pressure of civil society organisations and
sceptical governments – that CETA has undergone in its latest stages. It was easier
to rule on judicial impartiality and independence, for instance, after the appellate
application in the declaration to the Council minutes it added together with Austria, see Council of
the European Union, supra n. 53, No. 21, p. 14, where it both asserts ‘rights which derive from
Article 30.7(3)(c) of CETA’ while also stressing that the ‘necessary steps will be taken in accordance
with EU procedures’. France did not attach any declaration in its own name. According to Van der
Loo and Wessel, due to the fact that provisional application of a mixed agreement only covers
matters of EU exclusive competence, ‘only the Union (and not one or more Member States) can
terminate the provisional application of the agreement’: G. Van der Loo and R. Wessel, ‘The non-
ratification of mixed agreements: Legal consequences and solutions’, 54 Common Market Law
Review (2017) p. 735 at p. 761.
73Conseil constitutionnel 31 July 2017, supra n. 3, para. 70 (in the original: ‘un domaine inhérent à
la souveraineté nationale’).
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tribunal was introduced following the ‘legal review’ (also known as ‘legal
scrubbing’) of early 2016, which will be set up to correct decisions marred by legal
flaws at first instance and will achieve better overall coherence in future CETA
Investment Court System case law. Similarly, further clarification of the
importance of the right to regulate, especially in the Joint Interpretative
Statement, has helped in finding that CETA does not undo domestic legislative
and regulatory powers. The two points are connected, since legally well-trained
and impartial judges are bound to take cognisance of the strong textual and
structural foundations of the right to regulate in adjudicating disputes involving
CETA in the future. We will never know whether the original, ‘pre-Wallonia
crisis’ version of CETA could have stood up to scrutiny by the Conseil
constitutionnel, but CETA’s revisions – tedious and frustrating as they seemed at
the time – made its task easier. This beneficial exercise of contestation and
refinement should not be forgotten.
As a whole, and arguably to its greatest credit, the decision serves to build on
the Conseil’s earlier case law sketching out a modern notion of sovereignty. The
Conseil’s use of the concept of conditions essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté
nationale is instructive here, showing that what was at issue was not any form of
strict limitation of sovereignty, but rather the exercise of certain particularly
important competences – core state functions – by organs other than those of the
state, by virtue of a transfer of these competences to EU or international organs.74
There are limitations as to the extent and nature of such transfers, but these have to
be put in context and construed narrowly, in a manner that provides a reasonable
degree of leeway for the political branches. In this regard, it is important to recall
that ever since its famous IVG decision,75 it is clear that the Conseil aims to
maintain a limited review, i.e., review based on norms of the bloc de
constitutionalité, but no review of whether a law or international agreement is in
conformity with (other) international treaties already binding France. Concerning
laws transposing EU law, the standard of review is even more restricted, given that
participation in the EU and compliance with its laws is also a constitutionally
enshrined requirement for France.76
74M. Troper, ‘L’Europe politique et la souverainté des États’, in S. Goyard-Fabre (ed.), L’État au
XXe siècle: Regards sur la pensée juridique et politique du monde occidental (Vrin 2004) p. 181 at
p. 188-189.
75Conseil constitutionnel 15 January 1975, Décision n° 74-54 DC, Loi relative à l’interruption
volontaire de la grossesse, ECLI:FR:CC:1975:74.54.DC.
76Conseil constitutionnel 10 June 2004, Décision n° 2004-496 DC, Loi pour la confiance dans
l’économie numérique, ECLI:FR:CC:2004:2004.496.DC, para. 7, which references Art. 88-1 of the
French constitution. See further A. Levade, ‘La construction européenne et son incidence sur les
compétences étatiques et la hiérarchie des normes’, n° 102 Revue française de droit constitutionnel
(2015/2) p. 287 at p. 289-290.
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In the CETA decision, the Conseil had to apply the concept of conditions
essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté nationale in the particularly intricate scenario of
a mixed and ‘new generation’ Free Trade Agreement, i.e., a situation where both
France and the EU – within which France already has pooled many of its state
powers – would transfer competences to organs and mechanisms to be created by
CETA, and within which they would operate side by side, alongside the other EU
Member States and Canada. By keeping the constitutional limits narrow in this new
context, it showed that ‘sovereignty’ must not be abused as a generic label used to
declare illegal any measures and forms of collaboration that individuals or groups
dislike for political or ideological reasons. Sovereignty is to be understood not in a
static and zero-sum, but in a dynamic and cooperative way. Hence, the standard of
conditions essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté nationale as used here may also
appeal to other constitutional courts in Europe and beyond, especially those wishing
to confirm their respective countries’ commitment to international cooperation on
contemporary issues while protecting their sovereign prerogatives in a way that is
more deferential than the Bundesverfassungsgerich’s approach.
Europarechtsfreundlichkeit
Regarding the EU law aspects of the decision, the Conseil constitutionnel faced a
formidable challenge in having to rule on the constitutional conformity of a mixed
agreement without encroaching on the competences conferred upon the EU and
the ultimate authority of the European Court of Justice to interpret EU law. This
was achieved overall, also due to the use of the concept of conditions essentielles
d’exercice de la souveraineté nationalementioned above. However, there are certain
problematic instances where the Conseil should have clarified some important
points of EU law and deferred more emphatically to the EU institutions.
The demarcation of CETA into areas of exclusive EU competence and non-
exclusive competences (shared or Member States-only) was an essential
preliminary element of the decision. Hence, the Conseil constitutionnel could
have chosen to raise this as a preliminary question at the European Court of Justice
under Article 267 TFEU.77 Instead, the Conseil draws on the recently issued
Opinion 2/15 of the European Court of Justice on a trade agreement with similar
but not identical content. Regarding investment protection and the Investment
Court System, Opinion 2/15 is arguably clear enough that these are non-exclusive
competences. However, on the other provisions in a range of other chapters, the
77Since the Conseil constitutionnel is a court of last instance, one could even go so far as to speak of
an obligation to request such an opinion under Art. 267, para. 3 TFEU, though in practice a court of
last instance rarely heeds this obligation. Moreover, a problematic factor may have been the fact that
CETA has not yet entered into force. Nonetheless, it could have raised questions of EU law in more
general terms.
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Conseil at no point becomes very specific about why exactly they are shared. In
Opinion 2/15, by contrast, the European Court of Justice made it clear that
provisions in other chapter such as ‘Objectives and General Definitions’ and
‘Institutional, General and Final Provisions’ need to ‘relate to the provisions’ in
the chapter on investment and ‘to the extent that the latter fall within
a competence shared between the European Union and the Member States.’78
Nonetheless, although requesting a delimitation of competences from the
European Court of Justice in the form of a preliminary reference could have
clarified matters further, using Opinion 2/15 achieved judicial economy and
expediency, and also showed the requisite deference to the European Court of
Justice’s prerogatives and the principle of conferral more generally. It is unlikely,
moreover, that the European Court of Justice will deviate from its recent case law
in Opinion 2/15 in its forthcoming opinion on CETA, as requested by Belgium.
A principle of EU law which the Conseil constitutionnel does not mention – but
should have – is the duty of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.
This duty is particularly relevant in the context of mixed agreements, as
emphasised by the European Court of Justice,79 which used it in the past as the
textual basis for concluding that Member States have an obligation – not only
under international law but also as a matter of EU law – to implement mixed
agreements in their entirety.80 This notably includes elements falling within the
sphere of competence of the Member States. Admittedly, this would only apply
once an agreement enters into force and should not have bearing on the
a priori constitutional compatibility review powers of the Conseil and other
Member State courts. However, in its decision the Conseilmay be seen as painting a
picture of clearly delimited spheres of competence within which the responsibility
to implement is incumbent upon either the EU or the Member States. This
mischaracterises the composite nature of mixed agreements, the obligations under
EU law to comply with them in their entirety, as well as the requirement of paying
due consideration and, if necessary, deference to Union positions and interests.
Consequently, a clear reference to the duty of sincere cooperation – perhaps
construed as the TEU’s echo of the French constitution’s call to participation in
the EU as expressed in Article 88-1 – would have been welcome.
The final part of the decision is also quite striking, when the Conseilwraps up its
reasoning by turning its attention to the parts of CETA that fall under the
exclusive competence of the EU. Earlier in the decision, it had reiterated its stance
78EU-Singapore FTA, supra n. 5, para. 305.
79See, e.g., ECJ 15 November 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, Opinion 1/94 (WTO), para. 108;
and further C. Hillion, ‘Mixity and coherence in EU External Relations: The significance of the
“duty of cooperation”’, in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU
and its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing 2010) p. 87.
80ECJ 19 March 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:184, Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention).
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that it would only exercise marginal review of compatibility with French
constitutional identity as the standard for these areas. This dovetails with Article
4(2) TEU, where the EU commits to respect the Member States’ constitutional
identity. However, the Conseil avoided making this link explicit by referencing it
(nor did the Bundesverfassungsgericht for that matter).
What the Conseil subsequently did is arguably an exercise of perhaps well-
meaning yet misplaced judicial economy. It ruled that since the other provisions of
CETA are not at odds with French constitutional law, they cannot be, a fortiori, at
odds with its constitutional identity. Its reasoning ends there. This is succinct but
problematic. In line with the Conseil’s own differentiation of review standards, it
should never have expressed itself on the constitutionality tout court of CETA
provisions falling under the EU’s exclusive competence. This is – according to its
own distinction of standards of review – not within its power. As it correctly states
earlier on in the decision, it would only be for the European Court of Justice to
determine whether these provisions conform with EU primary law. Following
Belgium’s request for an opinion, the European Court of Justice now has an
opportunity to do exactly that.
Lastly, this summary reasoning was also a missed opportunity to learn more
about the content of France’s constitutional identity and its application in an
international context. From judgments and scholarship across Europe, we know
already that this is supposed to be a very narrow sub-category of constitutional
law.81 However, to date is has only been addressed by the Conseil in cases
concerning laws transposing EU directives.82 It would have been interesting to
learn whether the new context of mixed agreements had any impact on the
Conseil’s interpretation of the concept. Since the Conseil makes it clear that
nothing of what is contained in CETA raises any conflicts, it might at least be
implied that constitutional identity remains narrowly construed. Nonetheless, a
few more sentences explaining where we need to look for expressions of French
constitutional identity within the bloc de constitutionnalité, and which principles of
constitutional identity might have been at issue here, would have been welcome,
also with a view to EU law in terms of giving substance to the scope of
Article 4(2) TEU.
Nonetheless, while this would have provided useful obiter for academic
purposes and possible future litigation, the Conseil constitutionnel pays close
81See, seminally, F.-X. Millet, L’Union européenne et l’identité constitutionnelle des États
membres (L.G.D.J. 2013); E. Kloots, National Identity in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2015);
and A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for national identity
under the Lisbon Treaty’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 1417.
82See, from the more recent case law, Conseil constitutionnel 3 February 2016, Décision n° 2015-
520 QPC, Société Metro Holding France SA venant aux droits de la société CRFP Cash, ECLI:FR:
CC:2016:2015.520.QPC.
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attention overall to both the prerogatives of the European Court of Justice, and –
although mostly implicitly – to the prerogatives of the EU institutions in making
CETA work.
Conclusion
Having summarised and analysed the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel on the
constitutionality of CETA, three main conclusions can be drawn. First, the
decision is another enlightening exercise of dynamic multilevel constitutionalism
within the EU with a distinctly external outlook. The decision illustrates the
evolving content of CETA and needs to be seen as part of the ongoing judicial
scrutiny by various courts. Civil society pressures led to significant changes to
CETA, many of which are repeatedly highlighted by the Conseil in finding that
there is no constitutional conflict. The Joint Interpretative Statement and
declarations added to the Council minutes help to clarify matters further, in a way
that was not available to the Bundesverfassungsgericht earlier. The European Court
of Justice’s opinion on CETA will be the next step in this evolving saga, and it will
be interesting to observe the extent to which it pays homage to national courts in
its reasoning as part of the ongoing process of judicial dialogue.
Second, the decision prompts further reflection on the scope and content of the
Member States’ constitutional identity. In this regard, the decision is a missed
opportunity since it tells us very little about the content of France’s identité
constitutionnelle. Only in the negative sense: we now know that nothing in CETA is
at odds with it, confirming the general impression that is a very limited category. It
may also serve as a reminder that Article 4(2) TEU provides only an outer limit of the
core of national law that European integration cannot touch, and that each Member
State has a different constitutional identity, which may be more or less extensive.
Third, and most importantly, the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel illustrates
that cases such as these are extremely demanding as they require that courts balance
their duty to protect the constitution with their duty to respect EU law as well as to
pay due consideration to international political realities. The Conseil constitutionnel,
despite some points that could have been clarified as discussed above, fared well in
reconciling these different imperatives – not least due to its dynamic construction of
the notion of conditions essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté nationale. In particular,
it shows commensurate deference to the political branches, both at the national
and European levels, to engage internationally with like-minded countries on
contemporary issues of international economic governance, thereby underwriting the
EU’s ability to act despite being a complex collective international actor with
different levels of judicial and democratic safeguards.
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